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Abstract 
 
The rapid growth of sharing economy platforms such as Uber and Airbnb have garnered harsh 
criticism from national governments around the world. In the U.S. where these platforms 
originated, legal battles across the states are still on going, but robust public demand and support 
for these platforms ensure that lawmakers do not regulate them out of existence. In Europe, public 
engagement has yet to reach the point in which it will seriously affect the regulatory dispositions 
of lawmakers, as outlined in this paper. For this reason, it is apparent that European states are 
focusing more heavily on other factors outside of consumer demand1. This paper examines the 
regulatory crackdowns in Italy on ridesharing and France on home-sharing to identify the 
predominant factors that are leading governments to impose tough restrictions on these companies. 
By identifying unremarkable levels of public opinion, current and past political landscapes that 
heavily favor traditional service providers, and differing environments for innovation, it is evident 
that the leading contributors to a more regulated Europe are largely caused by the political capital 
of interests groups as well as cultural and historical aspects such as long-standing protection of 
taxi unions and the affinity for centralized government control, both of which, are difficult to 
maintain in the presence of the sharing economy. 
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Introduction 
 
The presence of the sharing economy in traditional markets continues to spark contentious 
debate. In the European context, much of this debate is centered on what constitutes the 
appropriate amount and severity of regulatory measures that allow states to effectively monitor 
and set boundaries on sharing platforms. Proponents of increased regulatory oversight and 
restrictions argue that unfettered market interruption damages established service sectors. This 
includes the undercutting of prices, labor shortages, and reduced consumer demand. As likely 
expected, regulatory opponents call on government to take a step back and allow the invisible 
hand to direct market entrance. European free market advocates seek to provide open access to 
new platforms in order to increase competition and boost entrepreneurial opportunities to benefit 
individual and federal wallets. In many European states, the argument has essentially been 
decided, one way or the other. States such as Estonia and Ireland have welcomed new sharing 
economy competitors into their markets, while fierce governmental opposition has developed in 
Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Germany2. Regulation aside, it is estimated that the economic 
size of the sharing economy in the EU alone is € 28 billion3. 
 
The aim of this paper is to identify the factors that contribute to the substantial regulatory 
differences that exist between European states. This paper poses three hypotheses. One, public 
opinion of member state populations hold substantial sway over the regulatory actions of 
governments. Two, differences in state regulation on ridesharing and home-sharing are due to 
political concerns. Three, traditional sentiments on innovation cause slow and unsteady 
integration. To examine these aims, this paper will examine two cases of government crackdown 
on sharing economy platforms in Europe, ridesharing in Italy and home-sharing in France to 
identify why these states opted to narrow the opportunity of market integration for these 
platforms. Three factors will be examined to determine whether or not the hypotheses are 
viable; public opinion, political environment, and the disruptor status of Uber and Airbnb. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. The first section is a literature review introduces leading 
research relevant to the topic. The second section provides background information to give 
needed context to the issue being addressed and will elaborate on the three factors noted above. 
The third section is the justification for the case selections chosen. The fourth section presents 
the methods used to gain findings. The fifth section presents both the data and findings of the 
methods used. Finally, the fifth section serves as a conclusion to the paper.    
 
Literature Review 
 
Current literature on the sharing economy is abundant but tends to focus heavily on whether 
platforms are a positive or negative force on economies, industries, and labor chains. For the 
purposes of this paper, two leading articles will be used to provide an overview of the current 
state of research on European response to the sharing economy with a more holistic perspective. 
The first, is the Rise of Uber and Regulating the Disruptive Innovator by Geoffrey Dudley, 
David Banister, and Tim Schwanen which. The second is Regulating the European Sharing 
Economy: State of Play and Challenges, by Malthe Mikkel Munkoe.  
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In Dudley, Banister, and Schwanen’s work, the authors focus on the rise of Uber, but assert that 
the hesitation of governments to open their markets to new competition points to a persistent 
aversion to market disruptors. The same disruptive nature that gives platforms such as Uber and 
Airbnb their successes, is the very same reason for their inability to effectively integrate into 
markets. Governments continue to impose restrictions against new competitors to lessen the 
number of consumer liabilities as well as reduce the need to reevaluate national industries4. 
 
The second article poses the idea of a ‘patchwork Europe.’ Munkoe identifies that European 
states hold vastly different regulatory standards for sharing economy platforms. His key factors 
include the high importance of public safety, employee rights, and protection of established 
businesses. He urges that these factors have equally contributed to the crackdown of regulation 
in European countries including, Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands5. 
 
The research of these works is fundamentally important to understanding the role of sharing 
platforms in our interconnected global markets, but the image these studies create is incomplete. 
This is not enough to understand the true context of the sharing economy in Europe due to 
differing public sentiments, diverse political landscapes, and varying market aversion to 
innovation, pointing to a clear gap in the research. This paper will offer a new evaluation that 
examines the differences in regulatory response between European states to develop a more 
comprehensive picture of the European environment in regard to the sharing economy. 
 
Background 
 
Sharing economy explained 
 
The sharing economy has many names and even more segment facets. Whether known as the 
peer-to-peer economy, collaborative economy, or gig economy its nature remains the same. 
Sharing platforms offer individuals the ability to work on their own time, using their own 
property to offer various services to the public. They utilize stagnant, and in some cases 
depreciating assets to boost their own profitability and societal productivity. This is the 
uniqueness of the sharing model. These individuals are known as independent contractors, a 
separate classification from traditional employees. Contractors simply utilize platforms to offer 
their services to platform users, without being bound by employment contracts. In theory, these 
individuals are their own employers, determining hours, equipment, and in some cases, pay6.  
 
One important difference between Uber and Airbnb that is important to note for the paper 
moving forward, is that ride-sharing operators must work at a set rate, giving them less discretion 
than an Airbnb host who can list prices at their preferred rate7. Major debate continues on 
whether or not these individuals should be allowed to skirt employee classification considering 
in many ways, they act in the same manner as employed individuals.  
 
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, individuals continue to seek alternative employment 
opportunities that give them greater control over their work environment. It is safe to assume that 
citizens always want more choice, rather than less. From an employment perspective, allowing 
sharing platforms to operate gives citizens increased access to markets they would customarily 
have to receive training, obtain certification, secure a job position, and commit to set wages and 
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hours to operate in. The simplicity and ease of signing up as a service provider for either use of 
their car or home, bypasses the timely and costly process of entering into a new career field. On 
the other hand, opponents view this ease as a direct effort to undercut the business of citizens and 
companies who do work in these fields, through more traditional avenues. For ridesharing, this 
means circumventing taxi licenses and, and for home-sharing bypassing hotel occupancy taxes, 
housing permits, and other safety regulations. In this way, sharing platform providers have a 
direct line of access to traditional market consumers without having to become accredited in the 
area or abide by traditional laws8.  
 
Factor 1: Public Opinion 
 
The development of ride and home-sharing companies answered growing demand for newer, 
better services that are geared toward the individual, not the collective. Uber allows consumers to 
order a car with the click of a button to their exact location in minutes. They can see who their 
driver is and their user generated ratings, view the cost of the ride before they order, and write a 
review of their experience once at their destination. The app adds a level personalization that 
traditional taxi companies cannot replicate. Home-sharing is much the same. The hotel industry 
prides itself on maintain brand standards. When a guest stays at a Hilton in London, it is likely 
that that another person staying at a Hilton in Budapest will have much the same experience. The 
standardization has made the hotel industry what it is, trusted and safe for travelers. In today’s 
society where guests increasingly prioritize uniqueness, individuality, and personalization, 
consumers are looking for alternative experiences. Airbnb and home sharing sites offer one of a 
kind stays to travelers. They embody their local surroundings and culture through style of home, 
décor, and the personal touches of the rental owners all for a price that is usually much less 
expensive that traditional hotel stays.  
 
Public opinion is shaped in many ways by public demand. The more the public wants a product 
or service the greater the belief is that it is a positive presence in the specific area. Government 
regulation in this sense can conflict with public opinion easily. A common motive that 
lawmakers cite in the regulation of industries is consumer safety, which rings true in many of the 
state led initiatives in Europe to restrict sharing platform access to markets. While safety is 
central to the goals of consumers, when weighed against the prioritization of increased service 
and product options, consumers often choose the latter. This can pit government interests and 
public interests against each other fairly easily9. 
 
Factor 2: Political Landscape 
 
In the European sense, the political landscape is widely diverse, but all states face similar 
pressures. From labor unions to leading companies, political officials are held accountable by the 
industries that dominate national industry sectors. With the European Union (EU) attempting to 
integrate as many facets of policy as possible, the sharing economy is no different. The EU 
readily voices its support for sharing economy integration into member states, citing more work 
opportunities for EU citizens and its growing effort to make the EU a digital hub. For member 
states, however, even the most EU-centric, EU involvement in national markets still receives 
intense pushback. Governments, both on the left and right, continue to assure their workforce 
and public populations that national industry remains in the hands of national leaders, rather than 
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EU officials hundreds or thousands of miles away in Brussels10. This assertion of national 
government competence leads governments to enforce sharing economy regulation that fits only 
the needs of their markets own rather than the whole of Europe.  
 
Factor 3: Industry disruptors  
 
Like SpaceX redefining space technology research or Bitcoin upending the financial sector by 
offering an alternative to traditional investing, ride and home-sharing companies are actively 
redefining transportation and lodging sectors. Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, and other sharing platforms 
hold a common status as an industry disruptor. This means they effectively steal a large share of 
the consumer market held by established companies. It also means they will inevitably 
experience the sharply negative consequences of holding this classification11. With it comes 
sharp skepticism, primarily over perceived damages to established industries, and severe 
regulatory obstacles that hinder integration into markets.  
 
It is inevitable that government plays catch up to innovation. The old adage that innovation 
leads, and government regulation follows, is truer in today’s start-up dominated global market 
chain than ever before. When new technology or services are introduced to the public for 
consumption and use, government’s first inclination is to regulate, but in the case of the sharing 
economy, how to regulate effectively and efficiently is still being decided.  
 
Case Selection  
 
To further the hypotheses posed, this paper looks at severe cases of regulatory crackdown. Italy 
and France were chosen for two reasons. One, tourism and travel are central economic drivers in 
their economies. This creates a level of similarity between the two states, due to their fierce 
protection of their tourism sectors, including transportation and hospitality. Two, they offer 
opposing views on what segments of the sharing economy to regulate. Italy has focused 
regulation on largely allowing Airbnb to function without too much government hinderance. 
Conversely, France has imposed strict restrictions and fines on Airbnb but has been hesitant to 
do the same for Uber. This is a unique paradox that provides a more comprehensive 
understanding of why European states are responding so differently to such platforms.  
 
Case 1: Italy 
 
Italy continues to be a fierce defender of its service industries, particularly its taxi conglomerates. 
Taxi services are a central segment of the Italian economy and are heavily regulated by regional 
and federal governments. The number of taxis on the road, the number of taxi licenses granted 
each year, annual driver fees, and consumer rates are all determined bureaucratically. This leaves 
little to no room for municipal decisions to change local regulations to benefit their area. Instead, 
it has been increasingly difficult for new taxi permits to be granted, effectively cutting off the 
Italian population from successfully entering the taxi market. The problem remains in the lack of 
municipal control. Too many taxis may affect larger cities like Milan, Florence, and Rome, but 
for less populated areas, more taxis can be sustained and are needed. Due to the national nature 
of this industry, this discrepancy has yet to be solved effectively. The entrance of Uber and other 
ride-sharing platforms in many ways was a private sector solution to this public sector problem. 
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By allowing non-licensed taxi drivers to offer their own services to transportation consumers, 
areas with taxi shortages could see increased movement and a solution to unmet demand. In 
larger, more overcrowded cities the benefits of ridesharing are primarily consumer centric. More 
options mean lower prices, more convenient pick up locations and times, and even greater ability 
to request the type and size of vehicle to accommodate specific needs. For consumers, 
ridesharing integration makes transportation more personalized, but this evolution is not a big 
enough gain for Italian legislators to open their markets12. 
 
Taking note of taxi labor unions is another key element central to this discussion. Labor unions 
are strong in Italy, especially those that represent the taxi industry. Union leaders have long-
standing and well-established relationships with Italian legislators, making it difficult for the 
interests of ride-sharing companies to find a foot hold at the legislative levels. The political 
capital labor unions hold is immense, approximately 35 percent of the Italian workforce hold 
membership in a labor union13. Industry health and viability is key to union member interests, 
which can form strong voting blocks that influence elections. For Italian lawmakers, it appears 
that the interests of established industry sectors still outweigh new economic opportunities.  
 
Even more imminent than voting however, are workforce strikes. Italy is no stranger to 
organized labor strikes. From taxi drivers, to bus and train operators, the country experiences 
strikes on a fairly frequent basis. Strikes in the transportation sector are strong enough to bring 
the country, and its tourism sector to a halt. With these consequences in mind, Italy’s visceral 
reaction to the integration of new car service is understandable. New competition threatens the 
security and longevity of an already over saturated market.  
 
Case 2: France  
 
Unlike Italy, France has a thriving ride-sharing sector. Uber and other platforms operate freely 
throughout the country and readily compete with taxi services. Home-sharing, however, has not 
been afforded the same leeway and continues to feel the brunt of French regulatory policy. The 
burdensome effects of recent crackdowns can be hard to see with over 65,000 listings still 
operating in Paris on Airbnb alone, but the platform and operators face a barrage of legal 
requirements that can make it extremely difficult to operate lawfully. It is assumed that a number 
of these listings are operating outside of the legal framework. In early 2018, France passed 
legislation that implemented licensing requirements for home-listers to acquire costly permits 
prior to listing their home on any rental platform. Failure to obtain a permit and post their listing 
without a legal permit number or for too many days can result in hefty fines upwards of € 5,000 
per infraction. This is up from a former € 450 prior to the regulatory change. In 2018, A Parisian 
homeowner who has been listing her home on Airbnb since 2011, was fined over € 57,000 for 
not acquiring an operating license and permit from the city14. With these restrictions in place, it 
is likely that the number of listings will decrease in the months and years to come as France 
further buckles down on home-sharing.  
 
Platforms face equally tough standards and increased liability under the new provisions. For each 
listing posted in Paris without the proper documentation, Airbnb can be charged € 12,500 per 
illegal listing on their site. After finding roughly 1,000 improper listings on Airbnb in 2018, the 
City of Paris fined the platform € 12.5 million which remains unpaid. It is important to highlight 
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that as ramifications upon the platform itself tighten, officials run the risk of Airbnb pulling out 
of Parisian or French markets altogether15.  
 
France is an important case to examine due to the large market that it offers to home-sharing 
platforms, but it is far from an outlier. Similar government intervention can be seen popping up 
in cities throughout Europe. London, Barcelona, and Berlin are all actively attempting to rein in 
home-sharing platforms operating in their cities. In Amsterdam, legislators recently reduced the 
number of nights homeowners can list their homes on rental platforms to a meager 30 nights per 
year, becoming one of the strictest regulations set upon listers throughout Europe16. Like France, 
the fear of increasing rent and home prices, the crowding out of natives, and reshaping 
communities is causing serious conversions to be had at local, regional, and federal levels about 
how to limit to spread of these operators.   
 
Methods 
 
The three factors outlined above, public opinion, political environment, and aversion to industry 
disruptors, will be applied to the cases of Italy and France to either reinforce or dispute the 
hypotheses posed at the start of this paper.  
 
To weigh public opinion, two Eurobarometer polls will be used to generate a picture of public 
sentiment on the sharing economy in both countries from 2016 to 2018. These surveys focus 
primarily on the presence of public demand and perceived lifestyle improvements that EU 
citizens view as a consequence of sharing platforms entering traditional service markets in their 
areas. Viewing these trends over time also allows us to analyze how public opinion has changed 
in accordance with more or less regulation, as government reactions have developed in response 
to market entrance.  
 
Political environment will be analyzed by looking at how political parties in power are 
interacting with labor groups and trade associations. These interest groups are playing a tangible 
role in the creation of obstacles and hurdles that sharing economy platforms are being forced to 
navigate. In many countries around the world, striking a balance between new and traditional 
companies or services is a difficult task for government officials, but one that is made a priority 
in order to advance economic interests and opportunities for citizens. In Italy and France, 
however, we see direct government overreach to keep new service providers down, to protect the 
interests of those traditional companies.  
 
Response to market acceptance of industry disruptors is a more difficult factor to examine. This 
paper will look at how Italy has received Airbnb and how France has received Uber. This will 
highlight whether these companies or if there is some innate difference between ride and home 
sharing that cause governments to regulate differently. To add numerical dimension, the annual 
Global Competitiveness Report will be referenced to further develop the status of Italian and 
French markets in regard to the sharing economy. The report focusses on the presence or absence 
of key factors in countries that contribute to innovation, entrepreneurship, and a startup culture. 
Analyzing both Italy and France will determine if there is a true aversion to innovation that 
hinders private sector development inherent to both states, or if Uber and Airbnb present specific 
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instances that call for increases regulatory attention.  
 
Data and Findings 
 
Public Opinion: 
 
This section uses data gathered from two Eurobarometer surveys to provide a broad picture of 
where European sentiments currently sit on the sharing economy. Figure 1 shown below offers a 
general overview of whether or not citizens believe that there are tangible benefits to using 
sharing platforms, from ride and home sharing to other peer created services. A massive 73 
percent of survey respondents answered that they view platforms as ‘a more convenient access to 
services’ indicating that European sentiments are leanings more toward a positive perception17.  
 
Figure 1: 
 
        Source: European Commission, Eurobarometer 467, 2018  
 
The same study conducted in 2016, Flash Eurobarometer 438, asked a similar question. Of the 
7,409 respondents, 41 percent answered that collaborative economy platforms are more 
conveniently organized for consumer use18. This percentage jump shows a growing awareness of 
the sharing economy across Europe and as the levels of awareness grows, convenience of sharing 
platforms is growing in the European mindset. This awareness, however, does not necessarily 
imply that general support for the sharing is increasing. More convenience does not 
automatically assume that consumers are less worried about their rights as consumers, general 
safety, or unfair competition.  
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To analyze the specific sentiments of the two cases in question, Figure 2 shows the responses of 
citizens in each member state to the question, ‘do collaborative services offer a wider range of 
services than traditional channels.’ Here, it is clear that the general perspective of the EU 
population does believe sharing platforms can increase the variety of services to consumers at 56 
percent. Italy and France range starkly on either end of this spectrum. Only 35 percent of 
surveyed Italians see new platforms as a path to more consumer choice, while 65 percent of 
French respondents do, a 30-percentage point difference. This is an evident sign that public 
support does not easily point to more or less government regulation, considering both countries 
in question have heavy regulation but vastly different levels of support. 
 
Figure 2: 
 
 
 
Figure 3 presents a more cultural snapshot, by highlighting whether or not the sharing economy 
is viewed as an opportunity to engage with other people but the conclusions are much the same. 
French sentiments on this factor are the highest in the EU. At 54 percent of French respondents 
see the use of these platforms as a way to engage with different people. Here, we can also see 
that this is barely of interest to Italian citizens. At the end of the spectrum, only 14 percent of 
Italians hold this same opinion19. These numbers indicate that there is little to no concern 
regarding the presence of the sharing economy in Italian sectors. The goal of platforms like 
Uber, Airbnb, and others are to provide better and more convenient options to consumers. 
Without consumers sharing this same need and belief, it is understandable why certain countries 
so readily push these competitors out of the markets.  
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Figure 3: 
 
 
 
Another telling section of the 2018 survey noted that 44 percent of Italians responded that 
alternative transportation platforms offer greater convenience than traditional services. Of 
European countries surveyed, Italian at 44 percent was the second lowest of all responses20. This 
could potentially be due to one of two opposing realities. One, that Italians are unable to access 
ride-sharing platforms and perhaps have not experienced the convenience of calling a ride with 
the click of a button. The second, is that Italians simply do not see a gap in their transportation 
market that would require a new competitor such as Uber.  
 
Overall, it is evident that Italian public opinion is consistently less favorable than EU averages 
and trends toward the lowest end of all spectrums presented. France on the other hand clearly 
holds strongly favorable opinions, coming in above EU averages in almost every category.  
 
Political Landscape 
	
The Five Star Movement continues to be very popular with young voters. The promise of 
increased opportunities, economic advancement, and bolstered innovation are driving the left-
wing populist party’s support. This would indicate a new commitment to introducing new 
companies, such as the sharing economy into Italian markets21. In the case of Uber, this hasn’t 
been the case. These officials are still as beholden to traditional labor unions, whose bodies make 
up mid to older generations of voters, as previous governments. Unions in Italy, similarly to 
France, are immensely powerful, and clearly more determinant than promises of MS5 to its 
youth population. Italian taxi unions have pull at every level of government and have played a 
central role in ensuring that Uber does not integrate into their market22.  
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In France, legislators are aiming to stem what they have coined ‘the law of the jungle.’ In their 
terms, serial Airbnb hosts are acting no differently than hotels. Much of this could be attributed 
to the heavy regulatory sentiments of France’s government23. It is no secret that France has 
always favored a more centralized government that implements blanket regulation, rather than 
opting to allow localities to enforce laws that are more suited to their own regions and areas. For 
sharing economy regulation this is no different. Current Airbnb restrictions centered in Paris are 
impacting all of France, reducing the ability of neighboring town populations to act as an Airbnb 
host24. France also holds a long history of government intervention in industry sectors. Tough 
regulation and high standards keep sectors functioning at a level of even quality, stringent price 
controls, and standardized employee work requirements and wages. The threat of the sharing 
economy is that the government is essentially unable to intervene in these factors. The draw of 
the sharing economy is that employee wages and hours are highly flexible and largely 
unimpacted by the requirements of its traditional market counterparts.   
	
Industry Disruptors 
	
Both Italy and France are experiencing high involvement of labor unions and industry trade 
associations to oppose sharing economy platforms from encroaching on their territory. This has 
similarly been the case in the U.S. but all in all, the sharing economy is functioning openly 
across U.S. states, with minor to no limitations compared to those of Europe. In both Italy and in 
Paris, France advertising Uber and Airbnb are respectively banned. This highlights the 
unwillingness of both governments to allow consumer demand of the platforms to grow. This 
begs the key question of why? France aims to be a global tech hub; which observers would 
assume that sharing economy integration would be a key asset of this. Other ‘tech hubs’ such as 
England and Estonia have effectively allowed the sharing economy to operate, increasing their 
regions entrepreneurship and opportunities to their citizens.  
 
To put these into perspective, this paper looks at the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report. This annual report analyzes 137 state economies and ranks them based 
upon productivity, attractiveness to entrepreneurs, and market openness. In the 2017-2018 report, 
Italy ranked a dismal 43 out of 137 countries. At first glance that may not seem too bad, but this 
number comes in after notoriously slow or unwelcoming economies like Russia, the Czech 
Republic, and Indonesia. For the eighth largest economy in the world, and third largest in the 
Eurozone, it would be expected that Italy should welcome new opportunities at a higher rate than 
it does. In the same report France comes in much lower, ranking 22 out of 13725, indicating a 
healthier environment for modernization that its southern counterpart.  
 
The report also includes a scale that scores states from 1 to 10 representing performance levels of 
innovation, 1 being the least performing and 10 being the most. At a rough score of 3.4, Italy 
lags behind France at a score of 4.5. This groups Italy with India, Indonesia, and Russia while 
France is close behind the UK, Japan, and Germany. To put this into perspective, the U.S., has 
the highest score of 6.5. This data indicates that while Italy may be struggling to gain a foothold 
in innovation development, France is readily keeping up with innovation leaders26. This does not 
point to any inherent aversion to market evolution or growth within France, on the contrary it is 
successfully becoming a beacon for innovators and entrepreneurs alike. 
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Conclusion 
 
The start of this paper posed three hypotheses. This section will explore whether the hypotheses 
are proven correct or if this paper’s findings have refuted initial assertions.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Public opinion of member state populations hold substantial sway over the 
regulatory actions of governments. As shown in the data section of this paper, public opinion in 
Italy was not as supportive of ride-sharing and other sharing economy companies as most other 
EU member states, including France. When considered comprehensively, looking at sentiments 
on convenience, access, and benefits, the numbers instead point to high uncertainty. Italy 
frequently ranked below almost every other EU state surveyed in each of the survey’s singular 
categories. Italians viewed the sharing economy in a very nuanced light, rather identifying these 
disruptors as purely positive or negative, or in favor of more or less regulation, it appears that the 
country is relatively unconcerned with the obstacles that lie in the way of integration. The lack of 
public support for the introduction of new alternative service providers, however, makes it 
unlikely that ride-sharing platforms will find a foot hold with lawmakers at the national level. 
 
This could be attributed to the level of harm the public feels due to high regulation. Unlike in 
Italy, where not having access to ride-sharing platforms is merely an inconvenience, in France 
citizens themselves are being fined and squeezed out of an opportunity to use their property to 
increase their personal incomes. People are experiencing government regulations that strip their 
ability to make independent decisions with their own property and tack on burdensome financial 
fees. The regulations to come out of Paris severely impact the owners of listed homes, not just 
Airbnb or other platform companies. Data in France on sharing economy sentiments 
overwhelmingly trended upward, toward the higher end of all EU states. Here, public opinion is 
at odds with government regulation which arguably paves the way for potential legislative 
change in the future, if these interests continue to find national support.  
 
The lack of Italian public support for the sharing economy could contribute to the ease in which 
the government has been able to ban Airbnb, but in France where there is substantial support 
regulations are still present. For these reasons, it is unlikely that public opinion holds any serious 
pull over the actions of either the Italian or French responses to Uber and Airbnb.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Differences in state regulation on ridesharing and home-sharing are due to 
political concerns. Both Italy and France face pressures from the industry leaders that run both 
the transportation and hospitality sectors of their markets. It is unclear, however, why political 
opposition has come from only one of the two sectors in each country. The main factor could be 
that taxi companies are simply inherent to the Italian economy. Not only do taxi organizations 
hold immense sway with political officials but perhaps it is about culture. The protection of this 
industry could be heavily symbolic of Italian society. The French political landscape is much 
clearer to understand. Hospitality groups have played a much more active role in opposing 
Airbnb by dominating the home-sharing conversation to increase public and government 
opinions that home-sharing ruins neighborhoods and French culture.   
 
Hypothesis 3: Traditional sentiments on innovation cause slow and unsteady integration. Italy’s 
taxi conglomerate is a driving sector of its economy and protection of its health is key to the 
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interests of Italian lawmakers. This commitment, however, is dampening Italy’s ability to 
compete. Innovation is slow, entrepreneurship is sluggish, and Italy is plagued with the same 
“brain drain” that many Southern European states are facing. Opening markets to accommodate 
access to new technologies could jumpstart its economy and slowly start to redefine its 
reputation as anti-innovation. But as the eighth largest economy in the world and fourth largest in 
the EU, Italy has the potential to be a real competitor in Europe and globally if consistent effort 
is put forward to do so.  
 
France does not align with this hypothesis, showing that the hypotheses is in fact faulty. France 
continues to lead in innovation and is keeping pace with other states as technologies and markets 
develop. For this reason, it is clear that France’s hesitation to integrate Airbnb into its hospitality 
market is not a side-effect of innovation aversion, instead it is predominantly political. It is 
concerned foremost with protecting its ability to effectively regulate industries and companies, 
which could explain the slight lag in innovation behind the U.S., U.K. and Germany among other 
states. The presence of Airbnb has the potential to reduce France’s control over new consumer 
platforms, products, and companies by setting a more open market precedent. 
 
In sum 
 
It is evident that public opinion has not had as much of an effect as political pressures and 
historical aversion to new innovation, this last point most noticeably in Italy. In relation to the 
Dudley, Banister, and Schwanen work, this paper does not conclude that the mere nature of Uber 
and Airbnb as market disruptor is enough to cause government crackdown. The nuanced 
environment of institutionalized industries, affinity for centralized control, and the influence of 
interest groups are more likely to be contributing factors. Additionally, Munkoe’s idea of a 
“patchwork Europe” does seem to be confirmed by this paper’s findings. State tendencies that 
are based on a variety of factors result in a variety of legislative outcomes. Political alliances and 
cultural tendencies, from the protection of taxi unions to the protection of centralized 
government, are the most tangible contributing factors. 
 
Further research could examine why labor unions and trade associations in Italy and France have 
tackled ridesharing and homesharing as equally. Why have taxi unions in Italy been more 
successful in opposing Uber than they have in France? Or why have French hospitality trade 
associations been able to influence government enough to impose strict regulations on Airbnb 
but Italian associations have not? These questions could be lent to additional research in the 
future, that would increasingly help to understand the driving forces behind the struggle of the 
sharing economy to gain a foothold across Europe equally. As the European Union seeks to 
further unify policy cohesion across member state borders this topic is likely to receive more 
attention in the future.  
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